Artefacts of representational choices
Duration: 35 mins 58 secs
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About this item
| Description: |
A talk given by Tim Button at the Moral Sciences Club on 23rd January 2024
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| Created: | 2024-01-25 09:19 |
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| Collection: | Moral Sciences Club |
| Publisher: | University of Cambridge |
| Copyright: | Faculty of Philosophy |
| Language: | eng (English) |
| Distribution: |
World
(downloadable)
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| Explicit content: | No |
| Abstract: | When we formulate theories, we make decisions about what to count as theoretically primitive and what to count as theoretically derivative. For example: when we are doing arithmetic, we might treat "+" as a primitive and we might define "<" in terms of "+". Metaphysicians might want to ask whether our decision---about what to treat as theoretically primitive (or derivative)---kept track of what is metaphysically primitive (or derivative). I doubt the question makes sense. To explain why, I'll offer some general considerations, a particular case study (about space), and a logical argument that you can't hope to avoid some artefacts of representational choices. |
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